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A new era of European Integration?  
Governance of labour market and social policy since the sovereign debt crisis  
Caroline de la Porte and Elke Heins 
1. Introduction: The European Union (EU) and social policy   
The EU aims to safeguard and to promote high social standards across the EU, while respecting 
welfare state diversity (Scharpf, 2002). However, since the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) was institutionalised in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty, the EU intervenes indirectly - as a 
functional spill-over from monetary integration - in social and fiscal policy. In 1997, the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) – a legally-binding process of policy coordination with EU quantitative 
benchmarks, policies to support monetarism, national reports and EU surveillance as well as 
corrective mechanisms in case of deviation from the benchmarks – was developed to ensure that 
the EMU would function optimally. More specifically, the SGP is designed to ensure that 
Member States pursue sound public finances under EMU – especially through the EU limits for 
public debt (maximum 60 per cent of GDP) and budget deficits (maximum 3 per cent of GDP) – 
but  without direct intervention in social policy. As social spending makes up the biggest share of 
public expenditure in Member States (more than half of total government expenditure was 
devoted to the functions ‘social protection’ and ‘health’ between 2002 and 2012 according to 
Eurostat figures), the pressure on national welfare states exerted by the SGP has therefore been 
considerable, especially during economic recessions. 
The core actors involved in EMU governance are economically-oriented, that is DG 
ECFIN, and the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs as well as the European Central Bank 
(ECB). These actors are concerned with upholding a monetarist paradigm, and with it supply-side 
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policies, such as labour market de-regulation as well as cost containment in areas such as pensions 
and health care (Barbier, 2012; de la Porte and Pochet, 2014; Scharpf, 2011). The SGP and its 
underpinning monetarist paradigm have not been without criticism. McNamara (2005: 156) notes, 
‘Although the SGP has the word ‘growth’ in its title, it is not likely to promote growth, but rather 
to be excessively restrictive at precisely the times that European states may need to stimulate their 
economies, as states are more likely to run up deficits in economic recessions.’  
In the mid-1990s and as a response to the EMU and the functional spill-overs on (pressure 
to decrease) social expenditure, the development of a ‘social dimension’ to the EU and especially 
the EMU, was seen as indispensable by left-of-centre political actors. The notion of a ‘European 
Social Model’ represents the idea that European welfare states are legitimately diverse, but that 
they all aim to uphold high social standards, working conditions and well-being, which should be 
supported by the EU (Jepsen and Serrano Pascual, 2005). In core welfare state areas, where 
Member States face similar challenges, such as unemployment, ageing populations and new social 
risks, the EU has promoted various ideas, for example ‘flexicurity’ (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009), 
‘active ageing’, or a ‘life course’ approach to labour market participation - facilitating breaks from 
the labour market for education, parenting, and care responsibilities without potential loss of job.  
These policy ideas, many of them central in the emerging ‘social investment’ paradigm 
(Morel et al, 2012) have been promoted in the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), thereby contributing to the development of the ‘European Social 
Model’, although only through voluntary policy coordination. These policies are developed by 
‘socially-oriented actors’, that is, DG Employment and Social Affairs and the Employment and 
Social Affairs Council. Compared to the ’economically-oriented actors’ they have a weak legal 
basis for influencing welfare state reforms. Indeed, all decisions about the organization, financing 
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and delivery of social security have thus far remained at national level. While some countries have 
adopted common EU policy ideas through the OMC, its overall impact on welfare reforms has 
been weak (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012).  
However, even the Treaty-based and thus much more enforceable SGP had its limitations. 
In the asymmetrical architecture of the EMU, monetary policy is pooled at EU level, while fiscal 
policy remains uncomfortably caught between EU and national level through EU pressure to curb 
public finances, but without direct or formal EU competency in this area (McNamara, 2005; 
Scharpf, 2002). While some Member States did undertake substantial reforms to comply with the 
Maastricht criteria – maximum 60% public debt and 3% budget deficit - prior to the 2007 financial 
crisis (see, for example, Hassenteufel et al, 2000; Jessoula, 2012), the SGP was not sufficient to 
keep all countries within the set limits (De Haan et al, 2004; McNamara, 2005). When the 2007 
global financial crisis laid bare the asymmetries within the Eurozone and problems with the SGP’s 
enforcement, this led to an incremental alteration of instruments and policies that affect welfare 
state reform, both indirectly, via the architecture of the EMU, especially regarding fiscal policy, 
and directly, aiming to affect welfare policy per se.  
 In this chapter, we analyse how the instruments developed in response to the crisis alter 
the existing EU institutional framework with regard to labour market and social policy. In the 
next section, we develop the analytical framework, consisting firstly of a typology for detecting 
changes in EU integration and involvement and secondly, of a clarification of concepts to 
analyse institutional change. In section three, we examine how new instruments have been 
developed since the onset of the crisis that affect the EMU and the social dimension. First, we 
analyse the development of instruments in the governance of fiscal and budgetary policy. We 
find that they have become more precise in terms of objectives, and stricter in terms of 
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surveillance and enforcement, and that new instruments have been grafted onto existing 
institutional frameworks through a process of layering. Thereafter, we analyse the development 
of instruments more directly aimed at social and labour market policy. The findings show that 
the new initiatives have been layered onto the existing foundation in Europe 2020, but that they 
are weak in terms of surveillance and enforcement. This signifies that their potential impact is 
weak compared to the instruments governing policy via the EMU. In section four, we analyse the 
implications of the findings for European social policy. Overall, we find that the alteration of the 
EMU governance framework with its pressure on fiscal consolidation, and as a side-kick the 
social investment strategy developed in a weaker framework, penetrate deeper into welfare state 
policies than before the crisis. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the significance of the new 
EU governance instruments for welfare states and the process of European integration.  
 
2.  Analytical framework for analysing alterations in EU integration in labour market and 
social policy 
 
In this section, we develop a typology of EU integration to analyse the main new instruments since 
the crisis and their significance for labour market and social policy along three dimensions: 
objectives (policy aims), surveillance process, and mechanisms of enforcement. For each, there 
are four possible degrees of EU involvement (from low to very high). Furthermore, a transversal 
issue we consider is the balance of actors involved, in devising policy objectives, and in the 
surveillance and enforcement processes. We argue that including employment and social policy 
actors (or other issue-specific actors) within a policy process provides a more comprehensive 
approach, for example, considering economic but also social sustainability aims, compared to 
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processes driven exclusively or mainly by actors in economic and financial affairs, which are more 
narrowly focused on aims of fiscal consolidation. Secondly, to render this analysis dynamic and 
longitudinal, we analyse how these instruments and policies have altered the EU institutional 
framework governing economic, labour market and social policy over time, with the use of four 
key concepts from the literature on incremental institutional change:  layering refers to creating a 
new policy grafted onto an existing institutional framework; revision refers to the formal reform,  
replacement or elimination of existing policy; policy drift refers to the altered effect of a policy 
due to changed circumstances, and conversion refers to redirection of an existing policy framework 
for new purposesi (Hacker, 2004).  
 
- - Table 2.1 here - - 
 
The first dimension of integration is objectives (policy aims), that is, how precisely and to which 
magnitude policy change is suggested, which is a first indicator of the depth of EU involvement in 
Member States’ social and employment policy, where EU competencies are marginal. We consider 
EU involvement as low if no change in objectives is required, but only minor changes to existing 
policies are suggested. Medium EU involvement would be indicated by more alterations, but 
without changing the institutional set-up. High (and very high) levels of involvement signify 
alterations with the potential for undermining the existing institutional structure and fundamental 
principles of a policy area, thus indicating a high amount of external pressure. A policy aim such 
as enhancing social sustainability of pension systems would imply low involvement unless this 
aim were accompanied by specific measures. Some objectives, such as adjusting the levels of 
pension benefits, would represent a medium level of EU involvement, as it does not signify new 
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principles of organising pension policy, but just an alteration within an existing institutional set-
up. while a policy aim suggesting reform of the existing pension system would signify high or very 
high EU involvement. In practice, and as we know from research on Europeanization of welfare 
policies, any policy objective would have a differentiated effect in Member States depending on a 
wide range of issues in the domestic arena, such as ideas, politics and markets. For example, in 
familialistic welfare states the promotion of formal childcare policies (such as targets for the 
number of children in early childhood education) may be seen as high EU involvement because it 
challenges the existing male breadwinner/female carer model and demands a significant change in 
policy objectives. In the Nordic welfare states, by contrast, such a policy merely confirms or re-
enforces the existing policy paradigm that supports the reconciliation of work with family life and 
EU involvement would thus be low. However, in order to fully appreciate the impact of the EU on 
welfare states it is necessary to consider not only domestic factors and the institutional fit with EU 
policy objectives, but also which type of EU surveillance and enforcement Member States are 
exposed to.  
The second dimension of EU integration is thus the surveillance of national policy by EU 
actors, which addresses with which mechanism the EU is endowed to monitor whether Member 
States are implementing the agreed policies and moving towards EU benchmarks and/or national 
targets. The strength of surveillance is indicated by the frequency of policy monitoring and on 
whether the basis for surveillance is soft or hard law. It is also important to take account of which 
EU actors are involved in a particular surveillance process. Some EU actors, namely the economic 
and financial actors, operate in areas where the EU has strong jurisdiction so that these actors have 
more power than others, such as the employment and social affairs actors, where the EU has only 
weak legislative competence.  
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The third dimension of EU integration is enforcement, referring to the type of measures 
EU actors have at their disposal to ensure implementation and/or corrective action in the case of 
non-compliance with or deviation from EU policy. The most coercive form consists of financial 
sanctions, although they have never been levied. Another form of enforcement consists of 
delineating a reform path and timetable to be followed in order to achieve an EU benchmark or 
aim in an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP) or ‘country specific recommendation’ (CSR). This 
may alter an institution in different ways depending on the specificity of objectives and how it fits 
with the existing institution. An EDP is treaty-based and designed to ensure that a country 
effectively corrects a deficit, while a recommendation under an OMC is merely a suggestion for 
reform, with no consequences in the case of non-compliance. In assessing enforcement, it is 
important to take account of the power balance between European institutions and Member States. 
In particular, the requirement of a qualified majority vote (QMV) gives more leverage to Member 
States, since a qualified majority of Member States must agree to impose a sanction. By contrast, 
a reverse qualified majority vote (RQMV) gives more power to the European Commission, 
because a qualified majority of Member States would need to agree not to impose a sanction. Up 
to present, it is a mechanism which functions as a threat, as it has never been applied. A very high 
level of enforcement, combined with very strict surveillance, occurs in the case of countries that 
are under EU bailout and have to subject themselves to rigorous conditionality as a consequence 
of loan receipt in Memorandums of Understanding  (see Theodoropoulou, this volume). In such 
cases, very specific policy objectives, a very high degree of surveillance as well as enforcement, 
lead to what we would call ‘intrusiveness’ into domestic settings. This particular type of EU 
involvement would be captured by the last column of our typology (see table 1 above). 
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3. Analysing governance of social and labour market policy since the crisis 
This section first presents the European Semester within which all new instruments are embedded 
and then examines the EU integration potential of each alteration to the governance architecture, 
in line with the framework delineated above. The figure below shows how the different instruments 
altering the EU governance architecture have been layered onto an existing institutional 
foundation.  
- Figure 2.1 here - 
 
The ‘European Semester’ is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU, 
agreed in 2010 which aims to increase coherence and effectiveness of economic and social 
policies. It is launched yearly by the European Commission via an ‘Annual Growth Survey’ (AGS) 
that assesses progress of the past year and sets out EU growth and job creation priorities for the 
coming year (European Commission, 2013c). ii The European Semester, and in particular the AGS, 
is very powerful for the agenda-setting process as it gathers all policy aims, instruments and actors 
involved in economic, social and labour market policy. Furthermore, it is used to forward proposals 
for further strengthening the institutional architecture of the EU (European Council, 2011).  
3.1. Altering the governance of EMU since 2010 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced EMU pooled monetary policy at EU level, while fiscal policy 
remained at national level. The 3 per cent budget deficit criterion was closely monitored and in the 
event of its breach by a Member State, an EDP could be launched. In the EDP, a plan has to be 
devised between the Member State and the Commission in order to exit the EDP, which could 
include reforms in pensions, health care or education. However, in 2005, this process was altered 
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to take account of public investments. This rule change was controversial as it was put forward in 
the context on non-compliance with SGP criteria by France and Germany which pointed to a 
politicization and thus weakening of the process. In essence, however, the initial institutional 
architecture was not altered. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, surveillance and enforcement of 
the SGP was medium, while the policy aims were highly specified (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). 
After 2010, when the Euro was under threat, the EU instruments governing EMU and the oversight 
of Member States’ budgets were reformed. The Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack 
have altered the institutional framework radically, but through a process of institutional layering 
rather than a revision of the existing framework. 
 
3.1.1. Six-Pack 
In December 2011, the ‘Six-Pack’iii was adopted to increase the strength and scope of surveillance 
of all Member State economies with some specific rules for Eurozone Member States, especially 
regarding financial sanctions. The Six-Pack introduces several novelties which enhance European 
integration regarding fiscal and macro-economic policy in terms of precision of objectives, 
mechanisms of surveillance as well as enforcement.  
First, with regard to specifying and monitoring fiscal consolidation, Member States’ budget 
balance should strive to reach country-specific Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs), 
which previously did not hold Member States accountable. The MTOs are now more constraining 
in that the Six-Pack ensures stricter application of the fiscal rules by defining quantitatively 
‘significant deviation’ from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it. Furthermore, an 
expenditure benchmark, that is, a rule which contains the growth rate of government spending at 
or below a country’s medium-term potential economic growth rate, was introduced with the Six-
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Pack. Also, country-specific structural balances are specified: they can range from a structural 
budget deficit of 1 per cent of GDP to a budget in surplus. These MTOs embody a high degree of 
surveillance compared to the situation before the crisis. The structural budget deficit is a new 
benchmark that has been added on to the original provisions in the Maastricht Treaty. The 
structural deficit, together with the 3 per cent budget deficit, is seen as more accurate than the 
budget deficit criterion alone as it aims to filter out temporary fiscal measures and evolutions that 
are due to cyclical changes in the economy (Verhelst, 2012). This preventative approach aims to 
keep Member State economies healthy in good times, rather than accumulating high deficits, and 
represents tighter integrated EU-Member State surveillance of budgets, by making them 
accountable to their own MTOs. Furthermore, enforcement is high: the Commission can issue a 
warning to a Member State in case of significant deviation from its own adjustment path defined 
in the MTO. National governments may thus have less leverage in defining (or rather 
differentiating) their national political agendas (including welfare state reforms), due to the more 
constraining MTO, and the structural budget deficit, which constrains their budgets and thus plans 
for expansive fiscal spending, such as in social and labour market policy (European Commission, 
2013b).  
A second novelty of the Six-Pack is the ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP) with 
accompanying indicators that is more far-ranging than the focus on public finances as under the 
original SGP. In 2012, eleven indicators were selected for a scoreboard by DG ECFIN for 
monitoring the health of Member States’ economies, including private debt, nominal unit labour 
costs and unemployment. This tool has enhanced the surveillance capability of the European 
Commission towards Member States. Although the Commission will take account of country-
specific circumstances, the scoreboard represents a tool to quantitatively assess national 
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economies. ‘Alert Mechanism Reports’ (AMRs) are designed to assess early on if there are risks 
of imbalances. If any risks are detected, the Commission can also request in-depth reviews of 
individual Member States to ensure the health of national economies. In the first AMRs, 12 
Member States were subject to in-depth review, while in the second, 14 Member States were 
subject to in-depth review (European Commission, 2012b).   
Third, the Six-Pack increases enforcement of the SGP in case of non-compliance since an 
EDP can be launched if a Member State has breached either the deficit or the debt criterion, where 
previously only the deficit criterion was operational. Concerning enforcement, an EDP is launched, 
like before the crisis, through QMV in the Council. The level of enforcement is therefore only 
medium in this respect. However, in contrast to the situation before the crisis, the punitive aspect 
of enforcement has become very high for countries not complying with the correction of  deficits 
or debts according to their plans. Indeed, if no effective action has been taken, quasi-automatic 
sanctions will be applied that could only be blocked by reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) 
in the Council. This means that a qualified majority of Member States (in Ecofin) must be against 
a Commission (DG ECFIN) proposal for a sanction to be overturned. This represents a high level 
of enforcement. If the EU Council is satisfied with the implemented measures to counter the fiscal 
imbalance following the sanction, then the deposit can be returned (Van Aken and Artige, 2013). 
This measure is accompanied by a high degree of surveillance to verify that agreed measures to 
correct the imbalance are carried out. While a sanction has never been levied, it represents a strong 
shadow of hierarchy, compelling Member States to comply with EU aims to avoid fines. 
In sum, fiscal consolidation objectives are highly specified and EU influence can be 
assessed as potentially high on this dimension as national governments have less leverage in 
defining (or rather differentiating) their national policy agendas (including welfare state reforms) 
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due to the budget-restraining MTOs. The Six-Pack embodies a more tightened and thus high 
degree of integration on the surveillance dimension compared to the situation before the crisis as 
a broader range of the economy is considered in the surveillance of Member State budgets through 
the MIP. In addition, with the new structural budget deficit criteria a new benchmark has been 
added to the 3 per cent budget deficit criterion of the original Maastricht Treaty. Finally, the Six-
Pack increases the enforcement of the SGP in case of non-compliance since an EDP can be 
launched if Member States have breached either the deficit or the debt criterion, where previously 
only the deficit criterion was decisive. The Six-Pack thus introduces benchmarks, mechanisms and 
processes through which to improve the plausibility of meeting the fiscal consolidation aims of the 
EMU and of preventing future crises. This has an indirect but strong spill-over on welfare policy, 
to which a large part of public expenditure is devoted.  
3.1.2. Fiscal Compact  
The Fiscal Compact, added in 2012, is another legislative initiative that strengthens the aim of 
fiscal consolidation, together with surveillance and enforcement measuresiv. It complements and 
further reinforces the SGP by including an automatic correction mechanism in the case of 
significant deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it and strengthens the 
automaticity of the EDP. It is binding for all euro area Member States, while other Member 
States will be bound once they adopt the euro or, upon their discretion, earlier and with the 
possibility to choose the provisions they wish to comply with (European Parliament and 
European Council, 2011). 
The Fiscal Compact specifies the rules for curtailing public debt in case that the limit of 60 
per cent of GDP is exceeded.v It also requires that Member States converge towards country-
specific MTOs with a limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP on structural deficits, also coined the ‘golden 
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rule’ (Verhelst, 2012). This can be extended to 1 per cent for Eurozone countries with a debt ratio 
significantly below 60% of GDP. Economists expect future MTOs to converge towards the 0.5per 
cent benchmark, which should be integrated in Member State constitutions because it would force 
Eurozone countries to have balanced budgets in good times, which would render the likelihood of 
more than 3 per cent deficits less likely in economic downturns (Verhelst, 2012). There is some 
flexibility, since the golden rule can be temporarily disregarded in exceptional circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the structural deficit targets enshrined in both the Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact, 
imply a high degree of enforcement and represent a further step in European integration by 
imposing Eurozone-fiscal discipline. However, even economists are concerned about the 
stringency of the golden rule, since it ‘risks obstructing public investments that address long-term 
challenges such as ageing and the shift towards a green economy. It seems therefore preferable 
that the implementation of the golden rule considers public investments. If not, Eurozone countries 
will, perhaps sensibly, be inclined to circumvent their golden rule’ (Verhelst, 2012: 3). In the case 
of circumventing the norms laid down by the Fiscal Compact, the ECJ can impose financial 
sanctions of up to 0.1 per cent of GDP in case of non-compliance, which reinforces the corrective 
enforcement (ECB, 2012: 83).  
Another novelty is that Member States must report on their national debt issuance to the 
Commission and the Council. This entails the expectation to discuss ex ante ‘all major policy 
reforms’, which suggests that it is negotiable bi-laterally with each Member State, taking due 
account of circumstances. The Fiscal Compact strengthens the enforcement mechanism of the 
SGP, since all stages of the EDP should be implemented within a clearly defined time frame. When 
the Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists, this decision can only be overturned by 
RQMV. The Fiscal Compact thus strengthens the decision-making capacity of the Commission 
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(compared to the Six-Pack) and reduces the political discretion of the EU Council. The measures 
for exiting an EDP and the timetable are negotiated between the Commission and the Member 
State, as was the case in the original SGP. Thus, there is some room for negotiation although the 
threat of bad credit-ratings from international rating agencies culminating in a sovereign debt crisis 
may incite Member States to follow reform paths developed with the Commission more closely. 
Furthermore, domestic politicians may use a breach of convergence criteria to implement sensitive 
reforms, while conveniently shifting blame to the EU level (see contributions in this volume; de la 
Porte and Natali, 2014). 
The Fiscal Compact, focused on fiscal discipline, builds on the Six-Pack, but makes the 
aims with regard to structural deficits even more stringent. Surveillance is high as Member States 
must discuss major reforms with the European institutions prior to their adoption. Ultimately, it 
reduces Member States’ room for manoeuvre with regard not only to fiscal consolidation, but also 
structural reforms, such as in health care, pensions and labour markets. Moreover, the Fiscal 
Compact requires Member States to include the country-specific MTOs in national binding law, 
preferably at constitutional level. The instrument represents yet another initiative layered onto an 
existing institutional framework, rather than revision, since none of the previous instruments are 
replaced.   
3.1.3. Two-Pack   
The Two-Pack, which came into force in May 2013, is a third initiative that has been layered onto 
the existent instruments governing the EMU (European Commission, 2013b). It specifies 
objectives in budgetary policy, together with high enforcement and surveillance mechanismsvi. Its 
novelty is to have introduced a common budgetary timeline and rules for all euro area countries. 
The Two-Pack has a significant impact on ‘sovereign’ budgets - the basis for policy making - as it 
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requires Member States to send their budget proposals first for approval to the Commission and 
the Eurogroup, before they are submitted to national parliaments.  
The fact that national budgets, and thus details of policy reforms, are the object of close 
scrutiny with strong potential for the EU to intervene in reform plans implies that Euro area 
countries are now developing budgets in the shadow of EU surveillance. The Commission and the 
Eurogroup in their first assessment of Eurozone countries’ draft budgetary plansvii in autumn 2013 
concluded that only two countries were ‘compliant’, three were ‘compliant without any margin for 
possible slippage’, three were ‘broadly compliant’ with ‘some deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTO’, and five were in the category ‘at the risk of non-compliance’. On this basis, 
recommendations were made to these countries. It is only in the case of ‘particularly serious non-
compliance’ that the Commission may request a revision of the draft budgetary plan. It remains to 
be seen, how effective enforcement will be, and how precisely the Commission could require 
alterations in national budgets. Still, it represents much more interference in Member State budgets 
compared to before the crisis.  
3.2. Altering the governance of the European Social Dimension since 2010 
In this section, we discuss how social policy aims and instruments per se have been altered in the 
wake of the crisis and what this signifies for the European social dimension. The coordination of 
European social and labour market policy was coordinated in the EES and various OMCs that 
have been institutionalised in the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 with the aim to achieve high levels of 
employment in combination with high levels of social protection. Pre-crisis, EU influence on 
setting policy objectives was medium, while the surveillance and enforcement of measures were 
low because the Lisbon Strategy was governed by the OMC (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). The 
Lisbon Strategy, now Europe 2020, has been based on policy coordination that operates through 
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policy learning and strong emphasis on benchmarking policy performance. However, there have 
been some institutional innovations to enhance the use of EU funding for Europe 2020 aims, but 
these are accompanied by weak mechanisms of surveillance and enforcement. From the 
perspective of institutional change, this too represents an instance of institutional layering on an 
existing framework.  
3.2.1 Europe 2020 
In June 2010, a new ten-year growth strategy coined ‘Europe 2020’ replaced the Lisbon Strategy 
as the main social and labour market policy instrument at European level (European Commission, 
2010b). Like the new instruments governing EMU, Europe 2020 firstly insists on fiscal 
consolidation in the crisis context. Beyond that, it is designed to deliver growth, if possible, 
socially and environmentally sustainable growth, requiring immediate investments, but to pay off 
later in terms of economic growth, as well as social well-being, equality and a greener 
environment. However, this strategy is dependent on significant government expenditure which 
governments encumbered by a high public debt are hardly able to provide.  
Europe 2020 is organised around five EU Headline Targets, which are supported by ten 
‘Integrated Guidelines’ covering economic, environmental, employment and social issues, and 
seven ‘flagship initiatives’, the latter being novel institutional innovations. The policies adopted 
in these areas are to be reported in ‘National Reform Programmes’ (NRPs). Concerning the policy 
objectives, two of the Integrated Guidelines are devoted to employment policy, and one to social 
exclusion, while there are no targets or guidelines for social protection issues. The aim to increase 
labour market participation stands stronger than ever – the previous benchmark of an average 
overall employment rate of 70 per cent was raised to 75 per cent (European Commission, 2010b). 
The ‘Agenda for new skills and jobs’ is the flagship initiative that aims at supporting this aim, but 
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also at ensuring workers are skilled and adaptable to an altering labour market. Concrete proposals 
of this agenda are to improve flexicurity, to equip the work force with appropriate skills for the 
modern labour market, to improve job quality and working conditions, and, finally, to improve job 
creation. Employment subsidies or targeted reductions of non-wage labour costs as well as the 
promotion of self-employment – arguably of precarious character in the context of a crisis - are 
among the suggested measures for job creation (European Commission, 2010a). These policies are 
by and large the same as those developed under the preceding Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010).  
The social aim consists of promoting social inclusion, intimately linked to increasing 
labour market participation, and combating poverty. Under Europe 2020 Member States have 
committed to ‘lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion’ by 2020 
(European Council, 2011). Member States have to specify their own national targets in this area. 
These targets are not very ambitious, which suggests a lack of real political will to take the EU 
target seriously (de la Porte and Weishaupt, 2013). Another flagship initiative - the ‘European 
platform against poverty and social exclusion’- supports the social exclusion aim of the EU. The 
degree of EU involvement regarding the Europe 2020 objectives is low for poverty reduction, 
while it is medium for objectives such as activation and raising employment rates.  
EU surveillance of Europe 2020 is medium, as it takes place ex-post as part of an iterative 
policy cycle, now coordinated in the European Semester. On the basis of the NRPs, CSRs  are be 
made to Member States, suggesting policies to be adopted for reaching the broad policy aims 
delineated in Europe 2020. Enforcement of the CSRs is low as the adoption of the suggested 
measures is voluntary. Existing evidence on CSRs on employment policies shows that they have 
at times been sources of inspiration for reform (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012). However, overall 
impact is low, particularly under conditions of fiscal constraint and low growth.  
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3.2.2 The Euro-Plus Pact (EPP) 
The EPP, adopted in March 2011, is based on the OMC between the 17 Eurozone members and 
six other countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania). Aiming at 
better economic policy co-ordination, it focuses on competitiveness, employment and financial 
sustainability, including a structured discussion on tax policy issues. It is a new initiative that has 
been layered onto the existing EU institutional framework. The EPP specifies objectives that 
primarily fall in areas which are under the competence of the Member States including wage 
monitoring, labour market reforms, tax reforms, pensions, health care and social benefits, fiscal 
rules and banking regulations.  
In labour market policy, some objectives touch upon core labour market issues, including 
decentralizing wage-setting agreements as well as revising wage indexation mechanisms 
(Barnard, 2012). The EPP penetrates into sensitive national welfare state issues, specifying 
objectives to a high degree. It is integrated into the European Semester, where Member States 
should report on progress made towards the main aims: surveillance is medium through analysis 
of progress made to issues that are central in the EPP, alongside the assessment of progress made 
in other processes. The EPP is voluntary, using the OMC, and surveillance as well as 
enforcement is therefore as low as it is for Europe 2020. While each Member State has the 
discretion to select their own national measures to achieve the common goals, and to decide how 
far-reaching reforms should be, national commitments should be integrated in the NRPs that are 
central for Europe 2020 and Stability or Convergence Programmes in the framework of the SGP. 
The Commission then assesses implementation by Member States of ‘Euro-Plus Pact 
commitments’ together with the assessment of other CSRs. Compared to the new institutional 
architecture around the EMU and even Europe 2020 with its headline targets and flagship 
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initiatives, the EPP objectives are not likely to make headway via an OMC process, since they 
require domestic political commitment. 
 
3.2.3. Social Investment Package (SIP) and Youth Guarantee 
Social investment is a comprehensive paradigmatic approach that emphasizes the need to invest 
in individuals and their skills throughout the life course so that they can participate in the labour 
market and combine this with other priorities, such as care responsibilities (European 
Commission, 2013d). It implies investing in institutions for early childhood, schools, vocational 
training, upper tertiary education, activation and life-long learning (see Morel et al, 2012). At the 
same time, temporary leave from the labour market should be facilitated without loss of job. 
Social investment ideas build on the foundations of the universal welfare state, which is 
developed to meet these aims (see Kvist in this volume).  
Social investment, especially since a 2013 Commission Communication on the topic, 
provides an overarching policy framework to coordinate policy developed in economic, labour 
market and social policy. Member States can receive CSRs in the area of social investment 
through Europe 2020 (European Commission, 2013d).  What differentiates it from the social 
OMCs and the EES is that funding, especially from the ESF, is intended to be better integrated 
with the SIP for the 2014-2020 period (European Commission, 2014). However, the EES was 
also combined with European funding and even where funding was linked to the EES aims, such 
as in the Central and Eastern European countries, the overall impact was weak (de la Porte and 
Jacobsson, 2012). Policy objectives are defined to a medium degree, while enforcement and 
surveillance are both weak, although they are medium if co-funding is included in pursuing an 
aim under the SIP. 
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Parallel to the launching of the SIP, an initiative coined ‘Youth Guarantee’ was launched 
in April 2013 via a Council Recommendation, due to the concern about youth unemployment. It 
was another instrument layered onto the existing Europe 2020 framework. The Youth Guarantee 
aims to ensure that all young people under 25 get a good-quality, concrete offer within 4 months 
of them leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. This is a specific policy objective, 
and is coherent with the supply-side aims of monetarism and also with the main gist of social 
investment. The purpose is to avoid the inactivity trap among young people, as this could have 
consequences for their future. The Youth Guarantee strengthens the aim to activate young 
people, which was part of the EES already from the mid-1990s. Member State progress in this 
area is reported in ‘National Youth Implementation Plans’ which have started to be reported in 
2014. What is different compared to the EES that also focused on youth is that €6 billion have 
been reserved in the ‘Youth Employment Initiative’ for the implementation of the Guarantee 
across Member States (co-funded with Member States). If the initiatives are co-funded, then 
surveillance and enforcement will be medium; otherwise, they will be low.   
4. Assessing the institutional alterations of EMU and the European Social Dimension 
Altogether, the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack have incrementally, and in rapid 
succession, been grafted onto the existing institutional framework to achieve aims of fiscal 
consolidation and balanced budgets already present in the Maastricht Treaty. Although their 
overall aims are not novel, they represent a major leap forward in EMU integration due to new 
benchmarks requiring fiscal restraint, combined with high levels of surveillance and monitoring. 
Through these new instruments, especially the monitoring of Member State budgets as well as 
reporting on structural reforms, Member States are under pressure to curtail expenditure in health 
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care, pensions, early childhood programmes and elderly care. The AGSs highlight the need to 
keep public expenditure growth below the rate of medium-term GDP trends and to correct 
macro-economic imbalances, to decrease account deficits as well as levels of indebtedness 
(European Commission, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2014). The necessary resources to facilitate 
investment in human capabilities and to facilitate participation of women on the labour market, 
key elements in a sustainable social investment strategy, may not be prioritised or could be 
under-resourced.  
Europe 2020, the main instrument to foster the European social dimension, aims to address 
the social and other non-monetary aspects of EMU and the EU. However, Europe 2020 and the 
instruments grafted onto it, in particular the SIP, are developed under the monetarist paradigm. 
Thus, instruments addressing social consequences of the crisis, for example the Youth Guarantee, 
frame policy responses that lean on supply-side policies. This was the case before the crisis as 
well, but the instruments and aims for fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and structural deficits 
were not nearly as constraining, effectively allowing for legitimate diversity. Now, the possibilities 
for diversity have become more limited through the framework and aims around fiscal and 
budgetary constraint.  
However, since the immediate effects of the crisis are receding, social aims that are not 
only at the service of EMU are taking shape: Member States are encouraged to replace existing 
temporary or precarious contracts with open-ended contracts, to provide more security to workers 
on temporary contracts, while introducing more flexible conditions for workers on open-ended 
contracts thus responding to dualization. Furthermore, there is a renewed emphasis on the need to 
develop childcare institutions in order to facilitate the entry of second earners onto the labour 
market (European Commission, 2014). However, the resources available from the EU are very 
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limited, which means that Member States need first to have balanced budgets and healthy 
economies to be able to make such investments. One possible institutional alteration would be to 
consider such investments as productive in the institutional architecture around EMU, if Europe is 
to improve and to maintain its social model. 
Table 2.2 below summarizes our findings with regard to the typology on EU integration 
and involvement, which shows that since the crisis, the EU has been much more involved in 
fiscal policy, a core issue for welfare states, but via the framework created for governing the 
Eurozone. It also shows that while there have been multiple initiatives integrated into and 
layered onto Europe 2020, these are governed by relatively weak instruments and processes, thus 
affecting welfare state reform through voluntarism only.  
 -- Table 2.2 here - - 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Since 2010, multiple new instruments have been created in the EU that affect welfare reform to an 
unprecedented degree. First, new instruments and policies have been grafted onto the existing 
institutional architecture to enhance the coordination of fiscal policy. The new norms, such as 
structural deficit rules as well as stricter enforcement and ex-ante surveillance of Member State 
budgets can be seen as a logical consequence of having more integration in monetary policy. These 
new rules have a significant impact on welfare states, as tight budgetary criteria makes 
expansionary public spending difficult even in healthy economies, let alone in crisis-ridden 
countries. The new instruments were agreed in unusually rapid succession in the context of an 
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ongoing Eurozone crisis, leading to considerable institutional change in the EMU architecture in 
a short period of time. The resultant institutional architecture holds Member States accountable to 
the EU ex-ante and ex-post with regard to their budgets and public expenditure, including social 
expenditure. 
Europe 2020, the instrument designed to coordinate employment and social policy and 
further develop the European Social Model, is comparatively weak compared to the sharpened 
objectives, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms in EMU. Although fostering social 
investment is on top of the EU social policy agenda, the extremely strict fiscal discipline and 
balanced budget rules which are highly institutionalised may undermine the implementation of 
Europe 2020.  
In the current situation, what is needed in order to ensure a life course approach to labour 
market participation, with a highly skilled labour force together with economic growth is social 
investment. This requires financing in the short-term in order to reap benefits in the future and the 
long-term, such as for example alternative forms of taxation and co-funding from the European 
Social Fund (ESF), although the effect of this is likely to be limited. The risks of missing the 
opportunity to develop social investment and to develop only a limited supply-side and liberal 
agenda is particularly high in countries that are still struggling not only with the effects of the 
crisis. Some of these countries lack institutions geared to make social investment sustainable - 
starting with early childhood education and care, through early childhood education and care, 
schools, higher education and life-long learning. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that EMU 
criteria and the new instruments developed for fiscal consolidation should be altered to take 
account of investments made in such institutions, if the social investment strategy is to meet its 
promises.  
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i In the framework developed by Hacker (2004) each type of change is associated with the types of political 
dynamics (coalitions and veto players) underlying possible type of change. In this article, we merely use the 
concepts to assess and to illustrate what types of changes have taken place in the European economic and social 
governance processes, without considering the political dynamics behind it. 
ii Through the AGS, the EU Spring Council in March issues guidance covering fiscal, macroeconomic structural 
reform and growth enhancement for national policies on the basis of QMV. The policy priorities decided in the AGS 
should be included in Member States’ Stability or Convergence programmes (concerning monetary policy) devised 
within the SGP, and in National Reform Programmes (NRPs) concerning economic, employment and social policies 
devised within Europe 2020 that are to be submitted in April. Finally, the Commission proposes Country Specific 
Recommendations, which are then to be adopted/altered by the Council before the summer. 
iii The legislation consists of these six parts: (1) strengthening surveillance of budgetary positions and coordination 
of economic policies, (2) acceleration and clarification of the EDP through a Council regulation, (3) enforcement of  
budgetary surveillance in the euro area through a regulation, (4) definition of a budgetary framework of the MS 
through a Directive, (5) prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances through a regulation, (6) 
enforcement of measures for correcting excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. 
iv The Fiscal Compact was signed in March 2012 by all EU members except the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic and is the fiscal part of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). 
v The difference between the actual ratio and SGP limit shall be reduced by an average rate of one twentieth per year 
as a benchmark. 
vi The Two-Pack consists of two regulations (based on Art 136 TFEU) complementing the Six-Pack in euro area 
countries to improve the transparency and coordination of Member States' budgetary planning and decision-making 
processes (European Commission, 2013b). 
vii  Applicable to those countries that are not under a macroeconomic adjustment programme. 
                                                            
